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The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times v. 
Sullivan was meant to protect our fundamental right to free speech 
from defamation lawsuits.  However, Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation, known as SLAPPS, continue to chill free speech 
through weak but expensive to defend defamation lawsuits.  In 
response to SLAPPs many states have passed anti-SLAPP statutes 
that are meant to identify SLAPPs, quickly dismiss SLAPPS, and 
punish plaintiffs who bring SLAPPs.  A difficult issue for federal 
courts throughout the country is whether these state anti-SLAPP 
statutes should apply in federal courts.  This Note examines the 
Supreme Court opinions in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., as well as various lower court 
opinions, and concludes that state anti-SLAPP statutes should not 
apply in federal court until Congress creates a federal anti-SLAPP 
statute. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Free Speech is an essential part of American democracy.1  But 
free speech like all other fundamental rights is not unlimited.2  A 
traditional limit to free speech is defamation law. Defamatory 
publications were not viewed as protected by the First Amendment 
because of their little social value.3  The exact formulation for 
defamation varied but generally required that: defendant must make 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2022. I would 
like to thank my Note Editor, Mike Petridis, my Faculty Advisor, Professor Laura 
Dooley for their assistance throughout this process. I would also like to thank my 
friends and family for their support during my law school career. 
1 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring). 
2 Id. at 373.  
3 Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 255–57 (1952). 
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(1) a defamatory statement (2) of and concerning the plaintiff (3) and 
published to a third party; truth would be a defense but it was the 
defendant’s burden to prove truth and a good faith belief in the truth 
of the statements was not a defense regardless of the defendant’s care 
in attempting to verify the statement’s truth.4  
This view of defamation law began to change in the Supreme 
Court’s landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.5  In New York 
Times the Supreme Court recognized the potential chilling effect of 
defamation law.6  Defamation law can create a chilling effect on free 
speech by perpetuating “a system of censorship” where people 
remain silent rather than risk the threat of civil liability.7  Requiring 
individuals to guarantee the truth of all of their statements would lead 
to self-censorship that would dampen the public debate guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.8  
In response to this fear of self-censorship, New York Times 
and its progeny transformed the substantive law of a defamation 
claim by requiring Plaintiffs to prove more elements to make a 
successful defamation claim. Plaintiffs who are public figures must 
now in addition to the common law elements prove that the 
statements were made with actual malice, prove the defamatory 
statement was false, and, at a minimum in some cases, prove that the 
defamatory statement was made with negligence.9  These substantive 
changes to defamation law make it much more difficult for plaintiffs 
to obtain a favorable verdict.  However, many are still a concerned 
about frivolous lawsuits that cannot be dismissed in the early stages 
of litigation.10 
 
4 See Rod Smolla, Rights and Liabilities in Media Content § 6:1 (2d ed. 2020). 
5 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
6 Id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
7 See David A. Anderson, Note, Libel And Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 
424-25 (1975). 
8 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.  
9 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986) (stating that plaintiffs have the burden of proving 
falsity in a defamation claim if they are a public figure or suing a media defendant 
for speech that is a matter of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 347 (1974) (allowing states to define the standard of liability for defamation of 
private plaintiffs as long as it is not strict liability).  
10 Coalition of Supporters, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-
slapp.org/coalition (last visited August 31, 2021) (listing organizations in favor of 
legislation against frivolous lawsuits targeting free speech rights). 
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Indeed, for some plaintiffs in a defamation action, the goal is 
not to prevail on the merits but to harass defendants and chill free 
speech.11  This is known as a strategic lawsuit against public 
participation or SLAPP.12  A SLAPP lawsuit often occurs when a 
wealthy public figure, files a meritless lawsuit in order to silence 
criticism and target the defendant’s financial resources.13 An 
excellent explanation and example of SLAPP lawsuits can be found 
in a segment by John Oliver where he talks about a SLAPP lawsuit 
by Bob Murray against HBO.14 
The segment criticized Bob Murray, a coal mining executive, 
who was sued after several coal miners died following the collapse of 
a mine shaft.15  The segment described Murray as “someone who 
looks like a geriatric Dr. Evil” and “arranged for a staff member to 
dress up in a squirrel costume and deliver the message ‘Eat Shit, 
Bob!’”16  The segment was a reference to a statement made by one of 
Murray’s disgruntled employees.17  Eventually, the lawsuit was 
dismissed, but it was still expensive and time-consuming for HBO 
due to the appeals process.18  The lawsuit cost HBO $200,000 in legal 
fees and tripled its libel insurance despite the lawsuit’s lack of 
merit.19  This lawsuit was likely a SLAPP because it was filed by a 
wealthy public figure, in response to public criticism, specifically in a 
state without an anti-SLAPP law (West Virginia), and was generally 
without merit.20   
 
11 See Eric Simpson, Comment, SLAPP-Ing Down the Right to A Jury Trial: Anti-
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and the Seventh Amendment, 48 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 169 (2016). 
12 Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents 
the Application of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1201, 1205 (2015). 
13 What is a SLAPP?, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-
slapp.org/what-is-a-slapp (last visited April 10, 2020). 
14 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: SLAPP Suits (HBO Television broadcast 
Nov. 21, 2019).  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 See The Marshall County Coal Co. v. Oliver, No. 17-C-124, 2018 WL 11243736, 
at *14 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) (dismissing Murray’s lawsuit at the motion 
to dismiss stage for failing to sufficiently plead any elements of a defamation 
claim). 
3
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In response to SLAPPs, states have gone beyond the 
substantive defamation law to protect defendants by enacting anti-
SLAPP statutes.21  Anti-SLAPP statutes seek to protect defendants by 
giving them extra procedural tools to quickly dismiss claims, allow 
defendants to appeal before a final judgment, recover attorney’s fees, 
and limit discovery.22  In essence anti-SLAPP statutes deter SLAPPs 
by limiting the monetary and time costs associated with defending 
SLAPPS, as well as punishing plaintiffs that try to use meritless 
lawsuits to silence their critics.    
An example is California’s Anti-SLAPP motion statute which 
allows a defendant to file a special motion to strike that must be 
granted when there is a lawsuit: (1) “arising from any act of that 
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech” 
and (2) the plaintiff fails to establish “there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail.”23  This Note will focus on defamation, but anti-
SLAPP statutes apply to any state claims arising from the exercise of 
free speech or the right of petition; anti-SLAPP motions are not 
limited to defamation claims and can sometimes even be applied to 
contract claims.24  Essentially, this statute forces a plaintiff to prove 
that he or she can succeed in a lawsuit related to a defendant’s free 
speech rights before full discovery is completed.  If the anti-SLAPP 
motion to strike is granted the claims that it applies to are dismissed 
and the defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees.25  
 Most defamation claims and other related claims that can be 
subject to anti-SLAPP statutes are tried in state courts because they 
arise under state law. Anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply to federal 
claims.26  Sometimes, claims that can be subject to anti-SLAPP 
statutes are tried in federal courts due to either diversity jurisdiction 
or supplemental jurisdiction.27  However, the federal circuits are split 
 
21 See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, 
http://www.anti-SLAPP.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Sept. 
19, 2020) (listing every state and territory with anti-SLAPP legislation). 
22 See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(detailing the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute).  
23 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2021). 
24 See Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708-710 (Cal. 2002) (explaining the 
“arising from” prong of the anti-SLAPP statute and explaining how a breach of 
contract claim satisfied the prong).  
25 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16. 
26 In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41, 47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
27 Eric Simpson, supra note 11, at 169. 
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as to whether they are required to apply state anti-SLAPP statutes.  
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.28 and Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co.29 state anti-SLAPP statutes should not be applied in federal 
court.30  Together, these two cases explain when state procedural 
statutes cannot be applied in federal courts because of the Erie R. Co. 
v. Tompkins31 doctrine.32  Anti-SLAPP statutes directly conflict with 
Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c), Rule 12(d), and Rule 56.33  All of 
these rules regulate procedure as prescribed by the Rules Enabling 
Act.34  Therefore anti-SLAPP statutes, as state procedural rules, 
should only be applied in state courts.  
This Note will argue that anti-SLAPP statutes are not 
applicable in federal court because they are procedural rules and 
conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Part II of this 
Note will explore the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shady Grove and 
the two potential tests for resolving conflicts between the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and state statutes.  Part III of this Note will 
explain the circuit split among the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeal in determining whether to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in 
federal court.  Part IV will explain why anti-SLAPP statutes should 
not be applied in federal court.  Finally, Part V will consider the 
future of anti-SLAPP legislation.  
 
28 559 U.S 393 (2010). 
29 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
30  See Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337 (explaining that after applying the reasoning of 
Shady Grove and Sibbach that a federal court may not apply the D.C. anti-SLAPP 
statute). 
31 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
32 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
398 (2010) (explaining that the      federal rule governs if it “answers the question 
in dispute”); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (explaining that the 
validity of a federal rule depends on “whether a rule really regulates procedure.”). 
33 Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(declining to apply anti-SLAPP statutes because they conflict with FRCP Rules 8, 
12, and 56).  
34 Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (The Rules Enabling Act gives the Supreme Court the 
authority to promulgate rules of procedure, so long as those rules do not change any 
substantive rights.).  
5
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II. SHADY GROVE’S TEST FOR CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE 
STATUTES AND FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The Erie doctrine refers to a series of decisions by the 
Supreme Court that explain when state law must be applied in federal 
courts in diversity actions.35  Erie’s tenets dictate that when a federal 
law does not control, federal courts are bound by the decisions of a 
state’s highest court and state statutes on matters of state substantive 
law, and there is no federal general common law.36  In Shady Grove, 
the issue was the conflict between a New York statute and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.37  The conflict occurred when a federal 
court sitting in diversity heard a class action lawsuit.38  The New 
York statute did not allow the lawsuit to continue because the statute 
contained an additional requirement that class action lawsuits may 
not be used to recover statutory penalties.39  However, if Rule 23 was 
applied, the lawsuit could continue because it did not include a bar on 
class action lawsuits to recover statutory penalties.40  The Court used 
the Erie doctrine framework to decide if Rule 23 or the New York 
statute should apply.41  Parts I and II-A of Shady Grove, which held 
that New York’s class action statute conflicts with Rule 23, had the 
support of five members of the Court rendering its opinion binding 
while the rest of the opinion failed to gain a majority.42  The Supreme 
Court used a two-part test to answer the question.43  The first part of 
the test examines whether the state statute and the federal rule 
“attempts to answer the same question.”44  First, the court identifies a 
procedural question.45  Then it asks whether a federal rule answers 
the procedural question.46  If the federal rule answers the procedural 
 
35 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
36 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
37 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. 
38 Id. 
39 Id; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901 (McKinney 1975).  
40 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398.  
41 Id. 
42 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 395-96 (Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the 
Court only in regard to Parts I and II–A and wrote an opinion with the Chief 
Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor for Parts II–B and II–D). 
43 Id. at 398 (“The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove's suit may proceed 
as a class action.”). 
44 Id. at 399. 
45 Id. at 398. 
46 Id. 
6
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question, the court applies the federal rule.47  If the federal rule is 
ambiguous because it can have two different meanings, then a court 
should read the rule in a way that prevents it from violating the Rules 
Enabling Act.48  However, a court should not contort or read 
ambiguity into an unambiguous rule so that it can apply the state rule 
or statute.49  Rule 23 allows “any plaintiff in any federal civil 
proceeding to maintain a class action” lawsuit if its requirements are 
met.50  If the federal rule is unambiguous, the rule must be given its 
full effect.51  Since Rule 23 is unambiguous, it will control any state 
statute that tries to change the requirements of maintaining a class 
action lawsuit.52  The focus of the analysis is entirely on the scope of 
the federal rule based on its text and purpose.  
In response to the dissent, the majority lists several reasons 
why federal courts should not speculate about the purpose of a state 
statute when deciding whether a federal rule preempts or answers the 
same question as a state statute.53  First, the question of whether a 
federal statute or rule preempts a state statute is a federal question.54  
This renders pronouncements by a state’s supreme court on the 
purpose of a rule to be unhelpful in federal court or jurisdiction.55  
Second, “federal judges would be condemned to poring through state 
legislative history — which may be less easily obtained, less 
thorough, and less familiar than its federal counterpart.”56  Third, 
state statutes are often passed with multiple purposes in mind.57  In 
some cases, “one State's statute could survive preemption (and 
accordingly affect the procedures in federal court) while another 
State's identical law would not, merely because its authors had 
different aspirations.”58   
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 405-06. 
49 Id. at 406. 
50 Id. 
51 See Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1217 (“Scalia gave great breadth to the federal 
rule by analyzing it according to its plain language”). 
52 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406. 
53 Id. at 402 (The dissent characterizes the state statute as being about a remedy 
rather than a class action because its “purpose is to restrict only remedies.”). 
54 Id. at 405. 
55 Id. at 404. 
56 Id. at 405. 
57 Id. at 404.  
58 Id.  
7
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In summary, using statutory interpretation to determine if a 
state procedural statute is a hidden substantive statute is best left to 
state courts.  Federal courts should only interpret federal statutes, and 
when dealing with state procedural statutes, federal courts should 
only focus on the text to decipher whether the statute is procedural.59  
If the federal rule is ambiguous and has a reasonable reading that 
would allow it to coexist with a state statute, federal courts should 
apply them both.60  If the only reasonable reading of a federal rule is 
one that conflicts with a purely textual reading of a state statute the 
court should apply the federal rule.61  Federal courts should not try to 
infer that the state statute is actually substantive rather than 
procedural when it clearly tries to answer the same procedural 
question as the federal rule.62  Five justices joined this part of the 
decision.63   
The Supreme Court was divided on the second part of the test 
which focuses on whether the federal rule in question violates the 
Rules Enabling Act.64  Justice Scalia explained that under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b) the Court is only authorized to promulgate rules that do 
“not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”65  Since § 
2072 restrains the Court in this way, Scalia reasoned the test is 
whether the rule really regulates procedure.66   
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion applies a simple and 
formalist test that is consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent.67  
To determine whether a rule “ really regulates procedure,” the rule 
must control “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 405-06. 
61 See id. at 406. There is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23 and the Court 
refused to analyze the state statute’s purpose outside of its statutory language and 
procedural effect. Id. at 405 n.7.  
62 See id. (criticizing the dissent for invalidating Rule 23 based on the substantive 
effect of a clearly procedural state statute that conflicted with Rule 23).  
63 Id. at 395. 
64 Id. at 398 (If a federal rule and state statute answer the same question the federal 
rule applies “unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress's rulemaking 
power.”). 
65 Id. at 407 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
66 Id. 
67  Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1217 (labeling the approach “formalist”); Abbas v. 
Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Justice Scalia's 
plurality opinion for four Justices strictly followed a prior Supreme Court 
precedent.” (citation omitted)). 
8
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recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy 
and redress for disregard or infraction of them[.]”68  “What matters is 
what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only ‘the manner and the 
means’ by which the litigants' rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it 
alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate 
[those] rights,’ it is not.”69  If the rule can be characterized as  
affecting “the manner and the means” in which a party enforces 
rights guaranteed by substantive law it is procedural under the Rules 
Enabling Act.70  The result of the procedural rule does not matter 
because almost all procedural rules can affect a person’s substantive 
rights.71  The substantive nature or purpose of the state law that 
conflicts with the federal rule is not relevant to whether application of 
the federal rule violates the Rules Enabling Act.72  If a rule is 
authorized by the Rules Enabling Act it is applied in all jurisdictions; 
regardless of its effect on state-created rights.73   
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed that Rule 23 
applied in the instant case.74   Justice Stevens also agreed with Justice 
Scalia’s analysis on how a federal court should decide that a federal 
rule conflicts with a state statute.75  However, Justice Stevens also 
reasoned that some state statutes cannot be preempted in diversity 
actions despite conflicting with a federal rule.76  According to Justice 
Stevens, the federal courts must apply a state statute if applying a 
federal rule “effectively abridges, enlarges, or modifies a state-
created right or remedy.”77   
Justice Stevens used the statutory language of the Rules 
Enabling Act to create his rule.  The Rules Enabling Act says, “such 
 
68 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
69 Id. (quoting Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most 
procedural rules do.”). 
72 Id. at 409 (“The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that the 
substantive nature of New York's law, or its substantive purpose, makes no 
difference.”). 
73 Id. at 410.  
74 Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
75 Id. (joining Parts I and II-A of the Court’s opinion which explain how Rule 23 
and the New York statute conflict because they answer the same procedural 
question). 
76 Id. at 416-17. 
77 Id. at 422. 
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rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”78  
The key word is any because some state procedural statutes also 
influence substantive rights.  In Justice Stevens’ opinion, Congress 
cannot tell states the “form that their substantive law should take.”79  
Therefore, even if a state has a statute in a clearly procedural form, 
the statute may still be substantive based on the outcome it seeks to 
create.80  A state procedural rule would apply rather than a federal 
rule because some state procedural rules are “so bound up with the 
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that 
substantive right or remedy.”81  Federal courts are expected to 
consider the scope and purpose of a clearly procedural state statute 
before applying a federal rule because federal courts may not apply a 
federal rule that abridges a state defined right.82   
Justice Stevens created a guide for applying his test to 
determine whether applying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
instead of a state statute would violate the Rules Enabling Act’s 
prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”83  Justice Stevens starts with the assumption that a 
state law in a procedural form is not substantive because a procedural 
form strongly suggests “a judgment about how state courts ought to 
operate and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and 
remedies.”84  Justice Stevens also cautions that the “the bar for 
finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one.”85  The bar is high 
because there would be heavy costs on federal courts trying to 
discover the true substantive purpose of a state law, and having that 
statute apply with a federal rule that seems to govern the same 
procedural issue.86  This position echoes Justice Scalia’s belief that 
federal courts should not focus on analyzing clearly procedural state 
statutes that may have hidden substantive purposes.87  
The Stevens’ Rules Enabling Act analysis continues with the 
text of the state statute.  In Shady Grove, it was clear based on the 
 
78 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (emphasis added). 
79 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 420. 
80 Id. at 419-20. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 § 2072. 
84 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 404 (majority opinion).  
10
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text of CPLR section 901(b) that it applied to New York laws, federal 
laws, and the laws of other states.  Section 901(b) prevents plaintiffs 
from maintaining a class action lawsuit based on minimum statutory 
damages regardless of what statute imposed the statutory damages.88  
In Justice Steven’s view, this is evidence that the statute is procedural 
because it affects substantive rights not created by New York.89  The 
New York courts interpreted the statute in the same way as Justice 
Stevens.90  The legislative history showed some specific state purpose 
by protecting defendants from potential “annihilating punishment” 
when the class action lawsuits are combined with statutory 
damages.91  The protection given to defendants is a potential limit on 
remedies which would be substantive under the Erie doctrine.92  
However, another purpose of the statute could be a more general 
policy of preventing unnecessary class action lawsuits regardless of 
the source of law in New York courts.93   
Overall, Justice Stevens found that the legislative history of 
CPLR section 901(b) was only evidence that legislators wanted to 
make it harder for certain litigants to file class action lawsuits in New 
York courts.94  Making it harder to file certain lawsuits is the same 
class of policy concerns “that might go into setting filing fees or 
deadlines for briefs.”95  Justice Stevens reasoned that when federal 
courts are faced with clear textual evidence that a state statute is 
procedural but has an ambiguous legislative history, a federal court 
should conclude that the statute is procedural rather than 
substantive.96  A court must apply the federal rule if a textually 
procedural statute only has speculative substantive concerns that 
conflict with a federal rule.97   
In summary, when deciding whether application of a federal 
rule that conflicts with a state statute would “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right” federal courts have been given two 
 
88 Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b)(McKinney 1975). 
89 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 434. 
92 See id. at 425 (according to Stevens states can construct substantive rules in a 
form that appears procedural). 
93 Id. at 435. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 436. 
97 Id. 
11
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tests.98  First, Justice Scalia’s plurality test asks whether the federal 
rule really regulates procedure.99  If the federal rule regulates 
procedure the court applies the federal rule.100  Second, Justice 
Stevens’ test states that federal courts should apply the federal rule 
unless there is little doubt that application of the federal rule alters a 
state-created substantive right.101  The evidence that a state statute 
created a substantive state-created right comes from three sources.  
The strongest evidence is the text of the statute, the next source is the 
decisions of state courts interpreting the statute, then the final source 
is the legislative history of the state statute.102  If the evidence is clear 
that the state statute is substantive, it applies, and if the evidence is 
not sufficient the federal rule will apply.103   
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE APPLICATION OF ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTES IN FEDERAL COURTS 
Shady Grove attempted to give lower courts a workable test 
that would promote uniformity among the lower courts.  However, 
circuit courts and district courts across the country have been divided 
on whether state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in federal courts.  
The First and Ninth Circuits have found that state anti-SLAPP 
statutes are applicable in federal courts.104  However, the D.C., 
Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that state 
anti-SLAPP statutes are not applicable in federal courts.105 
 
98 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
99 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
100 See id. at 410 (plurality opinion) (explaining that upon a finding that a rule 
really regulates procedure and a conflict with a state statute the federal rule always 
preempts the state statute). 
101 Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
102 See id. at 431-436 (Stevens, J., concurring) (analyzing evidence of whether N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 901(b) is substantive). 
103 See id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring) Justice Steven’s states that “[t]he mere 
possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient. 
There must be little doubt.” Id.  
104 Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. 
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999). 
105 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2015); La 
Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2020); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 
242 (5th Cir. 2019); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 
12
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A.  Federal Courts that Apply Anti-SLAPP 
In Godin v. Schencks,106 Godin commenced an action in the 
Federal District Court of Maine for a violation of federal due process 
rights and a state law defamation claim.107  The defendant sought to 
apply Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, known as section 556, in order to 
dismiss the claim and recover attorney fees.108  Specifically, section 
556 gives a special process for dismissing claims that arise from the 
exercise of a defendant's right to petition under the U.S. Constitution 
or the Constitution of Maine.109  The district court ruled that Maine’s 
anti-SLAPP statute conflicted with Rules 12 and 56, and so it did not 
apply in federal court.110  The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in 
federal court.111  The First Circuit reasoned that section 556 did not 
answer the same question as Rules 12 and 56.112  The court 
determined there was no issue in applying both the federal rules and 
the state statute.113  Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 are consistent with 
anti-SLAPP procedure because they “do not purport to apply only to 
suits challenging the defendants' exercise of their constitutional 
petitioning rights.”114  The First Circuit views the anti-SLAPP 
procedure as supplementing rather than conflicting with the federal 
rules.115  
The First Circuit, holding that Rules 12 and 56 do not conflict 
with anti-SLAPP, also characterized the anti-SLAPP statute as being 
substantive in nature rather than just procedural.  While it may appear 
procedural with its motion to strike, “Section 556 is ‘so intertwined 
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the 
state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 
 
F.3d 659, 673 (10th Cir. 2018); Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 
1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018). 
106 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
107 Id. at 80-81. 
108 Id. at 81-82. 
109 Id. at 82. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 88. 
113 Id. (explaining that Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 do not attempt to answer the same 
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56.”116  The First Circuit’s analysis of section 556 echoed Justice 
Stevens’ concern that state procedure can sometimes be used as a 
vehicle to protect substantive state-created rights.117  In addition, the 
First Circuit found that applying the anti-SLAPP statute would “serve 
the ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping 
and inequitable administration of the laws.’”118  If section 556 is not 
applied in federal court, the law is unevenly applied because 
defendants would not have access to the same defenses as they would 
have in state court.119  The First Circuit also found that not applying 
anti-SLAPP would encourage forum shopping because a plaintiff 
would bring a case to federal court instead of state court to avoid the 
various burdens of anti-SLAPP such as having to potentially pay 
defendant’s attorney’s fees, and not being able to use “the common 
law's per se damages rule.”120 
B.  Federal Courts that Do Not Apply Anti-SLAPP 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that an anti-SLAPP 
statute could not apply in federal court in an opinion by then Circuit 
Judge Kavanaugh.121  In Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC,122 
Yasser Abbas, the son of the president of Palestine, brought a 
defamation action against the Foreign Policy Group in the Federal 
District Court for the District of Columbia.123  The District Court 
applied the D.C. anti-SLAPP special motion and dismissed the 
 
116 Id. at 89 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
117 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (“A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a 
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the 
ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it 
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”). 
118 Godin, 629 F.3d at 91 (quoting Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 
F.3d 764, 773 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 
22, 27 n.6 (1988))). 
119 See Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 18, 942 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Me. 2008) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 (1977) (“One who falsely publishes 
matter defamatory of another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is 
subject to liability to the other although no special harm results from the 
publication.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2011) (requiring plaintiff to show 
“actual injury.”). 
120 Godin, 629 F.3d at 92. 
121 Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
122 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
123 Id. 
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [], Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/18
2021 SLAPPS ACROSS AMERICA 1717 
defamation claim, but the D.C. Circuit Court held that a federal court 
must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of the D.C. anti-SLAPP 
special motion to dismiss.124  The main issue on appeal was whether a 
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction may apply the D.C. 
anti-SLAPP statute.125  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court 
on other grounds by dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(6).126  The 
D.C. Circuit declined to apply the anti-SLAPP statute because the 
statute answers the same procedural question as Rule 12 and Rule 56 
of the FRCP and Rules 12 and 56 do not violate the Rules Enabling 
Act.127  The D.C. Circuit first identified a procedural question: under 
what circumstances must a court dismiss a claim before trial?128  
Rules 12 and 56 allow for dismissal only if the claim is not plausible 
or there is no dispute of fact.129  The D.C. anti-SLAPP statute tries to 
answer the procedural question differently because it requires that a 
plaintiff show a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that 
neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56 requires.130  Since D.C.’s anti-SLAPP 
statute answers the same procedural question as Rules 12 and 56, 
Shady Grove commands that courts should apply the Federal Rules 
instead of the anti-SLAPP statute unless Rule 12 or 56 violates the 
Rules Enabling Act.131   
 Although the federal rules and state statutes conflict, the 
analysis continues because § 2072(b) requires that Federal Rules do 
not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”132 The D.C. 
Circuit then had to decide what test it would apply to decide whether 
Rule 12 or Rule 56 violated the Rules Enabling Act by modifying a 
substantive right.133  The Circuit Court noted that the Supreme Court 
in Shady Grove was split on this issue with the plurality opinion 
giving one test, Justice Stevens giving a different test, and the other 
four justices not addressing the issue.134  The D.C. Circuit resolved 
the split by applying the Sibbach test which is still binding 
 
124 Id. at 1337. 
125 Id. at 1332. 
126 Id. at 1340. 




131 Id. at 1334. 
132 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  
133 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1336. 
134 Id. 
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precedent.135  Identical to Justice Scalia’s plurality test, the Sibbach 
test is “whether a rule really regulates procedure.”136  The court then 
applied the Sibbach test by holding that “pleading standards and rules 
governing motions for summary judgment are procedural.”137  While 
the D.C. Circuit used the Sibbach test, it also referred to a part of 
Shady Grove that characterized pleading standards and rules 
governing summary judgment as procedural.138  A federal court must 
apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of an anti-SLAPP 
statute because “Federal Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question 
as the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, and those Federal Rules are valid under 
the Rules Enabling Act.” 139  
In Carbone v. Cable News Network,140 Davide Carbone, a 
CEO of a medical center, brought a defamation suit against CNN 
based on an allegedly false news report about the medical center.141  
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 9-11-11.1, requires that claims 
related to a person’s exercise of free speech or right of petition under 
the state or federal constitution be subject to a special motion to 
strike.142  The Northern District of Georgia did not apply Georgia’s 
anti-SLAPP statute’s motion to strike, and CNN appealed.  The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide whether the district 
court erred in not applying section 9-11-11.1.143  In its decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the judgment of the district court 
and ruled that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute may not be applied in 
federal court because it conflicts with Rules 8, 12, and 56.144  The 
Eleventh Circuit ruled this way for several reasons. First, the court 
identified the procedural issue, which was “whether Carbone's 
complaint states a claim for relief supported by sufficient evidence to 
avoid pretrial dismissal.”145  Together, Rules 8 and 12 address pretrial 
dismissal before discovery and Rule 56 applies to pretrial dismissal 
 
135 Id. at 1337. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
404 (2010). 
139 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337. 
140 910 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2018). 
141 Id. at 1347. 
142 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2016).  
143 See Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1349. 
144 See id. at 1348. 
145 Id. at 1350. 
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after discovery.146  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Georgia’s anti-
SLAPP procedure conflicts with the federal rules by imposing a 
probability to prevail requirement      different from the plausibility 
standard and the genuine dispute of material fact standard.147  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that together Rules 8, 12, and 56 “provide 
a comprehensive framework governing pretrial dismissal and 
judgment.”148  Thus, “there is no room for any other device for 
determining whether a valid claim is supported by sufficient evidence 
to avoid pretrial dismissal.”149  Only Congress can create exceptions 
to this “comprehensive framework” through statutes or other rules of 
civil procedure such as Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act.150  The Eleventh Circuit characterized Rules 8 and 
12(b)(6) as creating affirmative requirements to discovery if its 
requirements are met.151  Rule 56 then creates a right to a trial on the 
merits if plaintiffs meet their burden.152  “[T]here is no room for any 
other device for determining whether a valid claim [is] supported by 
sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal.”153 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS MAY NOT APPLY STATE ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTES 
A.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 and State 
Anti- SLAPP Statutes, Same Question, Different 
Answer. 
A federal court may not apply a state statute if a Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure “answers the same question” as the state statute 
unless the federal rule violates the Rules Enabling Act.154  Rules 12 
and 56 provide the pretrial procedural hurdles a party must overcome 




148 Id. at 1351. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1353. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1351. 
154 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 
(2010). 
155 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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explained how Rules 12 and 56 must be applied by federal courts to 
screen out weak claims without sufficient factual allegations or 
sufficient evidence for a trial.156  How the rules apply is a uniform 
and comprehensive procedure that, similar to every other Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure, must be applied to “all civil actions” in 
district courts.157   However, state anti-SLAPP statutes place an 
additional pretrial burden that cannot be reconciled with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.158  
Before discovery, a defendant can challenge the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint by filing a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).159  A Rule 12(b)(6) motion’s standard of 
review requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts if taken as true 
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”160  A plausible 
claim has factual content that would allow a court to reasonably infer 
“that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”161  This is 
not a probability requirement, but it does require more than a mere 
possibility that the defendant is liable.162  A complaint with sufficient 
plausible factual matter “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge 
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is 
very remote and unlikely.’”163  However, a mere formulaic statement 
of the elements of a claim with only legal conclusions, bare 
speculation, or naked assertions, will not survive a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the complaint as a whole is supported by 
 
156 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that just 
stating the elements of  a claim will not allow a claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere 
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be 
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the 
plaintiff.”). 
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
158 Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334. 
159 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, 
J., dissenting). Judge Watford, joined by four other judges, dissented from the en 
banc decision not to bring the Ninth Circuit in line with Shady Grove. Id. (“Neither 
of those decisions is consistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent, and both 
warranted reexamination by the court sitting en banc.”) 
160 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 
570). 
161 Id. at 678. 
162 Id. 
163 Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556. 
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sufficient factual matter.164  Rule 12(b)(6) comprehensively answers 
the procedural question of what needs to be in a complaint before a 
plaintiff can  proceed to discovery.165  Anti-SLAPP procedure tries to 
answer the same procedural question as Rule 12(b)(6), which is 
whether a plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to avoid pretrial 
dismissal, but in a different way.166   
Anti-SLAPP statutes treat causes of action based on a 
defendant’s right to petition or free speech differently from all other 
causes of action unlike Rule 12(b)(6).167  According to Shady Grove, 
when Congress creates exceptions to particular rules, that is evidence 
that a rule applies generally.168  An exception to Rule 23’s 
requirements for the certification of class action lawsuits is 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(e)(1)(B).169  A similar exception to Rule 12(b)(6)’s general 
plausibility standard is Rule 9.170  Rule 9(b) requires that “a party 
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake.”171  Another exception to Rule 12’s pleading standard is the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.172  This Act 
modified pleading standards in some securities cases.173  Rule 12 
generally applies when evaluating the merits of a complaint except in 
specific circumstances.174  Only Congress can create exceptions to 
Rule 12’s general rule which applies to all cases not covered by an 
exception.175  Anti-SLAPP conflicts with Rule 12 by creating a 
 
164 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 
165 See id. at 678-79. 
166 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
167 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering 2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1(b)(1) (2020). 
168  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
400 (2010) (“The fact that Congress has created specific exceptions to Rule 23 
hardly proves that the Rule does not apply generally. In fact, it proves the opposite. 
If Rule 23 did not authorize class actions across the board, the statutory exceptions 
would be unnecessary.”). 
169 Id. 
170 See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir. 
2018) (characterizing Rule 9 “as exceptions to the general rule” to the requirements 
of a sufficient complaint). 
171 FED. R. CIV. P. 9. 
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heightened pleading standard that applies to particular causes of 
action. 
Anti-SLAPP procedure directly conflicts with Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.176  Rule 56 answers the procedural 
question of when a claim can be dismissed after the beginning of 
discovery but before trial.177  Rule 56 requires that a court “grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”178  Before granting a summary judgment motion, 
a court must grant an “adequate time for discovery” and only requires 
that a party with the burden of proof at trial designate specific facts 
showing that there is an issue for trial.179   
Some anti-SLAPP statutes are different from summary 
judgment because they impermissibly put the burden of persuasion 
on plaintiffs before a trial.180  The burden of persuasion is “[a] party’s 
duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors 
that party.”181  Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute, section 554.02, 
explicitly puts the burden of persuasion on the party responding to a 
motion to dismiss.182  Section 554.02 requires the responding party to 
produce evidence and persuade a judge before trial that the party has 
“clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are 
not immunized from liability.”183  Additionally, a judge is not 
required to make factual inferences in favor of the party responding 
to the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.184  Ultimately, this burden on 
the responding party may result in the dismissal of a claim when 
there is an issue of material fact.185  This is different from summary 
judgment because issues of material fact preclude summary 
 
176 See id. at 1334. 
177 Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2018). 
178 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
179 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). 
180 See Unity Healthcare, Inc. v. Cty. of Hennepin, 308 F.R.D. 537, 542 (D. Minn. 
2015). 
181 Burden of Persuasion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
182 MINN. STAT. § 554.02 (2021). 
183 Id. 
184 Unity Healthcare, 308 F.R.D. at 541. 
185 Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 848 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 
2014). 
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judgment, and when ruling on summary judgment a judge must make 
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.186   
An anti-SLAPP motion also stays discovery unless a party 
shows “good cause” for specified discovery.187  This good cause 
requirement for specified discovery is a very restrictive standard that 
is like “oil to the water of Rule 56’s more permissive standard” for 
discovery.188   Rule 56 does not put a restrictive “good cause” hurdle 
on plaintiffs seeking discovery if they have already complied with the 
requirements of Rule 8.189  For Rule 56, discovery is the norm, but 
under anti-SLAPP procedure, discovery is the exception.190  Since 
Rule 56 does not put a “good cause” burden on a party seeking 
discovery, but anti-SLAPP procedure does, there is a direct collision 
between the FRCP and anti-SLAPP.191   
Furthermore, anti-SLAPP statutes impose a probability to 
prevail standard that conflicts with Rules 12 and 56.192  The 
probability to prevail standard is one that “contemplates a 
substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff's probability of 
prevailing on his claims.”193  An anti-SLAPP statute applied in 
federal court creates a Rule12(b)(6) “plus” standard, that is more 
difficult to meet than Rule12(b)(6), for causes of action dealing with 
First Amendment rights.194  Contrary to anti-SLAPP motions, Rule 
12 only requires a plausible complaint at the pleading stage and Rule 
56 permits summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”195  A court does not decide on material disputes when 
applying Rule 12 or Rule 56 to dismiss a case before trial.  However, 
anti-SLAPP requires a court to consider factual materials in the 
 
186 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-255 (1986). 
187 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2021).  





192 See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 
2018). 
193 Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). 
194 See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1720-ODE, 2017 WL 
5244176, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017) (labeling Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute as 
a Rule 12(b)(6) “plus” standard for actions with a first amendment nexus). 
195 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 (1986). 
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pleadings, affidavits, and limited discovery to determine whether the 
plaintiff has a probability to prevail on his claim.196 
While most courts have focused on the conflicts between Rule 
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 with anti-SLAPP statutes, another rule directly 
conflicts with anti-SLAPP statutes.  Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a rarely discussed rule of conversion, directly 
conflicts with anti-SLAPP statutes.197  Rule 12(d) allows courts to 
consider matters outside of the parties’ pleadings when a party makes 
a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion.198  However, if the court considers 
material outside the pleadings, the court must treat the motion “as one 
for summary judgment under Rule 56.”199  If a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 
12(c) motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment, 
“parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the 
material that is pertinent to the motion.”200   
Rule 12(d) has a discretionary component and two non-
discretionary components.201  The discretionary component gives 
courts the option to consider matters outside the pleadings after a 
party makes a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion.202  The non-
discretionary components require that if a court does consider matters 
outside the pleadings, a court must treat the motion as one for 
summary judgment, and the court must allow a reasonable 
opportunity to present all materials relevant to the motion.203  The 
procedural question that Rule 12(d) answers is what a court can do if 
it considers any materials outside the party’s pleadings.204  Rule 12(d) 
commands that a court treat the motion as one for summary judgment 
but anti-SLAPP requires that a court use a standard different from 
summary judgment.205 
 
196 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
322; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (allowing courts to consider the 
pleadings, affidavits, and specified discovery for good cause when deciding 
whether to grant the motion). 
197 Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235. 
198 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1366 (3d ed. 2004). 
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
200 Id. 
201 See Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235-36. 
202 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, at § 1366. 
203 Id. 
204 Kimberly, supra note 12, at 1235. 
205 Id. at 1236.  
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B. Addressing Arguments About Why Federal Courts 
Should Apply Anti-SLAPP Procedure 
A common argument to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in federal 
court is that they serve as a distinct and beneficial supplement to 
Rules 12 and 56.206  Anti-SLAPP procedure is a distinct supplement 
to the Federal Rules because it can exist “side by side” with the 
Federal Rules, and it only applies to specific defendants who have 
been targeted on the basis of their free speech or right to petition.207  
The argument further states that the anti-SLAPP standard is a 
beneficial independent supplement to the Federal Rules that protects 
certain defendants from the costs of litigation, but this position is a 
policy argument that ignores the policy behind the more permissive 
Federal Rules.208  Another common argument is that not applying 
anti-SLAPP statutes encourages forum shopping and would burden 
federal courts because plaintiffs would be encouraged to bring their 
claims to federal court to avoid the burden of anti-SLAPP statutes.209  
To a certain extent, this is true, but legal questions should not be 
determined by workload, and fixing the potential forum shopping 
should be done by the Supreme Court or by Congress.210 
The Supreme Court has been very conscious of Rule 
12(b)(6)’s role in protecting defendants from needless and expensive 
discovery.211  Despite the potential costs of discovery, the Supreme 
Court still recognizes that on a motion to dismiss all factual 
assertions must be taken as true and that there is no probability 
requirement at the pleading stage.212  While it is theoretically possible 
to apply Rules 12 and 56 along with anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss, 
this ignores Rule 12(d).213  Rule 12(d) makes it clear once matters 
outside the pleadings are presented, which anti-SLAPP generally 
allow in the form of affidavits, a party’s only option is a motion for 
summary judgment.214 
 
206 See La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2020). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 88. 
209 Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010); La Liberte, 966 F.3d at 88. 
210 Id. 
211 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). 
212 Id. at 556. 
213 See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010). 
214 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, at § 1366. 
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There is no doubt that protecting First Amendment rights is an 
important policy interest.  Ultimately, it is for Congress and not the 
federal courts to determine whether there should be a procedural 
mechanism to protect a person’s First Amendment rights; especially 
one that is different from the Federal Rule’s more permissive 
standard for pretrial dismissal of claims.215 
Even without anti-SLAPP statutes, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure still have efficient ways to dismiss weak and frivolous 
defamation claims that threaten free speech before a trial.  This Note 
has emphasized that Rule 12(b)(6)’s “plausibility standard” is very 
different from anti-SLAPP procedure because it is easier to meet.  
However, it should also be understood that it remains a significant 
barrier for plaintiffs asserting their claims in general.216  Particularly, 
the formal pleading requirements created by Ashcroft v. Iqbal217 have 
resulted in people experiencing a higher rate of dismissal of their 
claims.218  The current standards applied in federal court are high 
enough to create a difficult time for plaintiffs to reach discovery, 
regardless of anti-SLAPP statutes.  
A defamation claim’s evidentiary standards, including the 
requirement that a defamation claim of a public figure contain clear 
and convincing evidence of actual malice, are applicable when a 
court rules on summary judgment.219  Thus, on summary judgment, if 
plaintiffs do not have sufficient evidence of every element of their 
claim, including the strict clear and convincing  evidence standard of 
actual malice in public figure cases, their claim will be dismissed 
before trial.220  The  failure of proof at the pretrial stage of an 
essential element of the claim means there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.221  The result is that merely pointing out the plaintiff’s lack of 
evidence by a defendant can be enough for summary judgment; Rule 
 
215 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 
(2010) (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”); see La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2020) (labeling the 
Federal Rules to be more “permissive”).  
216 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 
VA. L. REV. 2117, 2170 (2015). 
217 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
218 Reinert, supra note 216, at 2170. 
219 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 
220 See id. at 254; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
221 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.  
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56 is a powerful tool for efficiently dismissing claims.222  Important 
to note is that Rule 56 procedure is different from the practice in 
some states, which requires a defendant moving for summary 
judgment to present evidence before a court will grant summary 
judgment.223  While the concerns about SLAPP lawsuits chilling free 
speech are an important concern, it is also important to remember that 
the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already stack the deck in 
favor of defendants with ways to dismiss defamation  lawsuits at 
early stages of litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning in Shady Grove and other Supreme 
Court precedent, it is clear that state anti-SLAPP statutes should not 
be applied in federal courts because anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.224  Specifically, anti-SLAPP 
statutes conflict with the uniform and comprehensive procedure for 
pretrial dismissal created by Rule 8, Rule 12, and Rule 56.225  
Together, these rules leave no room for an alternative standard for 
pretrial dismissal unless Congress creates an exception or an 
exception is created by the standard rule making process.226  The 
states may not create an alternative procedure for federal courts even 
if it is for a reason as venerable as protecting people’s First 
Amendment rights.  
However, the debate does not end there on anti-SLAPP 
statutes.  Recently, a member of Congress has introduced a federal 
anti-SLAPP statute.227  Many other groups such as “law professors, 
commentators, and businesses” have been in support of a federal anti-
SLAPP statute.228  With such a wide range of support Congress may 
soon pass a federal anti-SLAPP statute.  Before such a statute is 
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modified (July 11, 2001). 
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225 Id. at 1351. 
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passed by Congress it would be a mistake for the federal circuits to 
apply state anti-SLAPP statutes.  We should all be concerned about 
people like John Oliver and others whose free speech is being 
suppressed by overly litigious plaintiffs; but we should also 
remember that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already do a 
good job at protecting defendants from weak claims.  
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